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ABSTRACT: 
 Human Rights took a significant shape following the Universal Declaration in 1948. Since then systems of law 
have sort to see that these rights are guaranteed and protected. The common law system in the United Kingdom 
is one of such systems that have ensured the protection of rights of its citizens. But one glaring aspect of rights 
which remained lagging as seen in the decisions of courts in England was the right to privacy. The criticism that 
followed the shortcoming of the common law system in guarantying right to privacy appears to have been put to 
rest following the Decision in Wainwright v United Kingdom and the domestication of its principles. By 
analysing the case of Wainright v United Kingdom, this article x-rays and exposes the shortcomings of the 
common law system and celebrates the stability now being enjoyed by the legislative intervention of British 
parliament in domesticating the European Convention of Human Rights into the Human Rights Act, 1998. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Human beings as a matter of natural course are entitled to certain rights which are a reflection of a necessary 
good for common humanity. Such rights are perceived to be so fundamental and inalienable that its denial will 
derogate and perhaps extinct the very essence of human existence. This point is richly emphasised in the 
American declaration of independence on 4th July 1776 that “we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”.  
It was on recognition of these that the General Assembly of the United Nation on 10th December 1948 adopted 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 1 declares that ‘all human beings are born equal in dignity 
and rights…endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in spirit of brotherhood’1. 
This emergence of human rights law in international sphere is one of the most significant developments since the 
Second World War.2  
Sequel upon this therefore, states have over the years evolved systems of legal structure to provide adequate 
safeguard of these fundamental principles of human right and rules of equality for the protection of human 
dignity and right of existence of all persons. In pursuit of this, it was realised that even within the western bloc, 
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction of states to provide its citizens of these sacred rights without international 
interference was no longer adequate. As a result, the emphasis for the creation of an international instrument for 
human right protection that will bind every member state became necessary to provide effective global legal 
structure to offer the much needed protection respecting the rights of victims of human right violations in any 
member state. This entails a substantial surrender of sovereignty and jurisdiction of state to accommodate a 
common good of humanity. These views dominated in the proposal for the European Convention on Human 
Rights which confers upon individuals rights enforceable against the state within the community confines. The 
underlying principle of human rights as properly enshrined in the convention is regard for human dignity and 
freedom of persons. And human freedom and human dignity requires that individuals should be given the 
leverage and latitude to choose how best to shape their life or conduct their personal affairs and relationships 
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 See Article 1 United Nation Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
2
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with others without unnecessary interference. The “right to be left alone” as it is being described in some 
jurisdictions like the USA, is not the limit of responsibility of the state in guaranteeing these rights as envisaged 
by the convention. There is therefore a positive responsibility on the part of the state to ensure that these rights 
are provided and where there is a possible breach, adequate framework for remedy should be in place. 
In England, the rights under the convention are not automatic in terms of domestic application. The convention 
must therefore be incorporated into the domestic law by Act of parliament as exemplified in the Human Rights 
Act 1998. This is very important to the significance of the convention under the British constitutional law 
arrangement to which the parliament is supreme. In the words of Lord Bridge in R V. Home Secretary, exp. 
Brind:1 
“It is accepted, of course, by the applicant that, like any other 
treaty obligations which have not been embodied in the law by 
statute, the convention is not part of the domestic law, that the 
court accordingly have no power to enforce Convention rights 
directly and that, if domestic legislation conflicts with Convention, 
the courts must nevertheless enforce it.”2 
Prior to the reception of the Act, it is not to be said that the common law as well as statutes did not recognise 
various facets of human rights in England even as recognised by the convention. Rights such as the right to life, 
rights to personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of association and 
assembly, freedom from arbitrary search and seizure, personal injury tort, and so on all have been recognised by 
the English law. 
But strikingly, it has been held by the courts in England that the common law as well as statute has no room for 
general right to privacy as such. In the words of Glidewell L J in Kaye v. Robertson3  
“…it is well-known that in English law there is no right to 
privacy, and accordingly there is no right of action for breach of a 
person’s privacy”       
But subsequently, the courts appeared to have displayed willingness to establish law of privacy by introducing 
the common law breach of confidence.4   
However the measure of rights protected under common law breach of confidence is bellow the degree of 
protection of privacy to which the convention guarantees under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which provides for right to respect for private and family life and correspondence. This point became 
glaring following the House of Lords decision in Wainwright v United Kingdom5 . 
In this paper, we consider the scope of the right guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR against the backdrop of the 
decision in Wainwright v United Kingdom (supra). We expose in this paper the very limitation and deficiency of 
the traditional common law system of protecting Human Rights following the decision of the House of Lords in 
this case6 and examine the very ambit and the scope of right under the convention via the domestication Act7 as a 
necessary legislative instrument in filling the gaps. 
2. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM PRIOR TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1989: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE WAINWRIGHT’S CASE. 
 Rights are important to humans. And every modern society makes laws which are geared towards the provisions 
of rights to protect its citizens as well as ensure order and social security in a democratic climate. 
                                                          
1
 (1991) 1 A.C 696, 747  
2
 C Baker,  The Act in Outline  in Christopher Baker (gen. ed), Human Rights Act 1998: A practitioner’s Guide (sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1998) 5 
3
 (1991) FSR 62 at 66 
4
 See Hellewell V Chief Constable of Derbyshire (1995) 1 WLR 804 at 807 
5
 (2007) 44 E.C.H.R. 40  
6
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 A right simply implies that a person has the entitlement to lay claim over a thing either in rem or in persona. As 
has been identified by Hohfeld, there are; claim rights, where a person holds an assertion over a thing above 
another’s claim on the same thing; liberty rights, where a person is free to conduct his affairs and business as he 
deems proper; a power, entitling or empowering a person to partake in something; and an immunity where a 
person is protected against the arbitrary power of another person.1 
According to Charles Humana2 Human rights are the laws, customs, and practices that have evolved over the 
centuries to protect ordinary people, minorities, groups, and races from oppressive rulers or governments.   
The English law over the years have developed system which recognises the civil and political rights of citizens. 
Prior to the reception of the Act, the common law as well as statutes did recognise various aspects of human 
rights even as guaranteed by the European convention on Human Rights. Rights such as the right to life, right to 
personal liberty, freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of association and 
assembly, freedom from arbitrary search and seizure, personal injury tort etc. Apart from these, there also exist 
parliamentary enactments which are specifically provided to ensure that the rights of citizens are adequately 
guaranteed.3 However, it is obvious that there is no specific statute which sought to guarantee the citizens’ right 
to privacy neither did the common law. As pointed out, the lack of specific law of privacy in English law was 
felt to be one of the most glaring deficiencies of the traditional common laws system of protecting human rights.4 
Although, attempts were made by the common law Courts in England to develop certain rights which sought to 
protect certain aspect of privacy interest such as common laws of trespass, defamation, and confidentiality. In the 
case of Malone v Metropolitan commissioner5 the court was of the opinion that the action must fail partly on 
grounds that the applicant’s claim for breach of privacy was an action not recognised by English law. On the 
same breath, in kaye v Robertson6  the court of appeal after admitting that the invasion by reporters into the 
applicant’s hospital room while he lay sick and conducted an interview with him was ‘monstrous’, however held 
that there was no law for breach of privacy under the common law as such, that the claimant would have relied 
on the law of malicious falsehood to remedy his claim.7 
The effect of the obvious lacuna in the common law became more glaring following the controversial but 
celebrated case of Wainwright v Home Office8 where the House of Lords in upholding the decision of the 
Appeal court affirmed that there was no right to privacy under the common law. 
 The facts are that Mrs Wainwright and her disabled son went to visit her son O’Neill in prison at HMP Armley, 
Leeds, who was remanded on grounds of suspected murder. He was suspected by prison authority of supplying 
drugs in the prison to which the governor, acting under Rule 86(1) of the prison Rules 1964 (consolidated 1998) 
which empowers the prison authority to conduct searches on any visitor of the prison, had ordered that all 
visitors to the prison be strip-searched. They were subsequently upon their arrival taken to different rooms to be 
searched. Mrs Wainwright was asked to remove her cloths and underwear in a room overlooking an open 
window and had her genitals and anus inspected. Her son was also told to remove his cloths and his boxer shorts 
and he had his penis lifted by an officer. They both were made to sign a consent form to which they did not read 
before signing. They did not continue with the visit. Upon examination, Mrs Wainwright was found to have 
suffered from emotional stress and her existing mental condition had deteriorated. Alan the son had suffered 
from post-traumatic disorder as a result of his experience.     
The applicants subsequently brought an action before the Leeds crown court for alleged battery, trespass to 
person and breach of privacy. The Judge was of the position that the search was conducted contrary to the prison 
Rules as it was not proportionate to legitimate concern to prevent drug smuggling in the prison and was as such 
unlawful. The court held further that the search constituted a breach of the applicants’ rights to privacy as they 
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 R Clayton and H Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (vol 1, Oxford 2000) 19-20 
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 In his book, world Human Rights Guide (3rd edn Oxford 1992) 4 
3
 For instance, Abortion Act 1967, Education Act 1996, Data protection Act 1998, are all specific statutes which 
seeks to protect human rights. 
4
 S Foster ‘Prison searches, the rights to privacy and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2006)11(2) Cov. L.J, 59-
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5
 (1979) Ch 344 
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could rely on the provisions of Article 8 of ECHR even though the Act had not been domesticated at the time of 
the breach. 
On appeal, Court of Appeal held that actionable trespass upon which the action is based does not extend to 
where a person was asked to take off her clothes. The court further held that the applicants could not rely on 
Human Rights Act 1998 as the act complained of took place before the Act was domesticated and came into 
force. The claimants therefore could not rely directly on Article 8. The court however found the touching of the 
boy’s genital as battery as it was in breach of the prison rules.  
The claimants further appealed to the House of Lords. The House of Lords in dismissing the appeal held that 
there is no such action available for invasion of privacy in English law. The House of Lords also held as an 
obiter dictum that the action may not have succeeded even if the Act was applicable following the fact that a 
negligent act which eventually affected the privacy of an individual does not necessarily give rise to a right 
under Article 8. 
The action was finally taken before the European Court of Haman Right where the applicants claimed violation 
of Article 3, Article 8 and Article 13 of the convention respectively.   
In considering the issues before it as to whether there was a breach of Article 3, the court took into account 
whether the purpose of the search was to humiliate the personality of the complainant. In properly applying the 
case of Yankov v Bulgaria1 the court held that for there to be a breach of Article 3 the search must have been 
conducted in a manner which tends to humiliate and in fact degraded the personality of the complainant 
evidenced in the procedure adopted. Where a search is carried out with a legitimate intent and with respect for 
human dignity, Article 3 need not be invoked. In the instant case, the treatment was not severe enough to warrant 
a breach of the said section.  
However, the court held that the requirement to submit to strip-search is an interference with the rights under 
Article 8. The court was of the opinion that although the search was in legitimate pursuit of fighting drug 
problem in the prison, it was however carried out in a disproportionate manner for failure to adhere strictly with 
the prison rules. As a result of the circumstances above, there was also a breach of Article 13 of the convention. 
3. NATURE OF RIGHTS PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 8 OF ECHR 
The convention under Article 8 has indeed filled the obvious gap of the traditional common law as long as Right 
to privacy is concerned. Its subsequent domestication into the English law with its full effect enforceable from 
October 2000 has indeed marked a change in the British constitutional and legal arrangement. As pointed out by 
Professor A T H Smith2: 
 “There can be little doubt that, through the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, the UK is on the verge of 
making major changes to its  constitutional arrangement for the protection of rights, and commensurate with that, 
to the fabric of common law”  
This arrangement is beautiful and worth appreciation to the extent that while the Rights are been incorporated 
and domesticated, it allows and recognises the legislative supremacy of the parliament.  
 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states as follows: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. 
From the tenor of the forgoing provision, it is obvious that the Article 8 is aimed at safeguarding those aspects of 
rights which are considered private to the human person. The wording of the provision clearly shows an outright 
intention to protect the individual from any arbitrary interference to his personal life by state authority. A liberal 
                                                          
1
 (2005)40 E.C.H.R 36  
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approach to the interpretation of the ambit of this provision may be misleading as to suggest that a state that 
merely refrains from interfering with the rights sought to be protected will be in total compliance. It definitely 
requires more than that. There is therefore a negative as well as a positive responsibility on the part of the state in 
complying with the provision. The court in Marckx v Belgium1 emphasised on the positive responsibility of the 
state when it stated that;  
“When the state determines in its domestic legal system the 
regime applicable to certain family ties…it must act in a manner 
calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life”.2 
It was on the basis of this positive responsibility that formed the 
basis upon which the court held in Airey v Ireland3 that failure to 
provide legal aid for a woman who sought judicial separation 
amounted to a violation of the said right under Article 8. 
However, the right under Article 8 is not absolute in nature. There are given instances when these rights can be 
interfered with but only in limited circumstances. The state under such circumstances will be justified to interfere 
with these rights provided that such interference is within the justifiable ambit of Article 8(2) that is to say; in 
accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, economic well-
being of the country, prevention of crime, and protection of rights and freedom of others.   
The substantive areas of right protected under Article 8 are; 
(a)  Private life; 
(b) Family life; 
(c) Home; and 
(d) Correspondence. 
(a)Private life 
The concept of respect to private life is definitely wider in scope and goes beyond the mere right to privacy. The 
European commission in the application brought before it in Bruggemann and Scheuten v Federal Republic of 
Germany4  stated that; 
“The right to respect for private life is of a scope as to secure to the 
individual a sphere within which he can freely pursue the development 
and fulfilment of his personality. To this effect, he must also have the 
possibility of establishing relationships of various kinds, including sexual, 
with other persons. In principle, therefore, when the state set up rules for 
the behaviour of the individual within this sphere, it interferes with the 
respect for private life and such interference must be justified in the light 
of paragraph (2) of Article 8”. 
The court further stated in Niemietz v Germany5 that; 
“The court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an 
exhaustive definition of the notion of ‘private life’. However, it would be 
too restrictive to limit the notion to an ‘inner circle’ in which the 
individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude 
therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. 
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the right to 
establish and develop relationship with other human beings.”  
                                                          
1
 (1979-80)2 ECHRR 330 
2
 D Gomien short guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd eds 2005 council of Europe)80 
3
 (1979) 2 EHRR 305 
4
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5
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Thus, the scope of what constitutes private life has generated some arguments among human right lawyers. But 
plethora of cases suggest that the following areas of private life are protected; 
Right to moral and physical integrity  
An individual is entitled a respect to his moral and physical integrity. The state must therefore make provision 
for vulnerable persons to seek remedy. A person must not also be subjected to compulsory treatment or physical 
examination. In Y.F v Turkey1 the court held that the gynaecological examination carried out on the applicant’s 
wife while she was in detention without her consent amounted to a violation of her right to respect for private 
life. Similarly, in X and Y v The Netherlands2 the court held that the refusal to make available the right to 
prosecute for sexual assault by a mentally handicapped minor was a violation of her right to respect for personal 
life. Similarly, in Raninen v Finland3 the court was of the view that the unlawful detention and handcuffing of 
the applicant by the military authority and several refusals to allow him to carry on with military training 
violated this right.  
However, it is to be noted that not every degree of act which affects individual moral and physical integrity will 
necessitate a violation of this right.4  
Right to personal identity 
Every individual has a right to his or her personal identity without unnecessary interference from any state 
authority. The individual should be at liberty to shape his life the way and manner in which he wishes to be 
identified according to his personal perception. He should be able to choose his name5, mode of dressing, 
appearance, and sexuality. The court has also held that an individual under this right is entitled an access to 
information relating to his upbringing as that cannot be refused on grounds of confidentiality6. 
 
Respect for private space 
Embedded in the provision of Article 8 is the right to respect for private space. This is not only limited to the 
right to quiet enjoyment of permanent place of abode but also include temporary places like the hotel rooms, 
restaurant and other semi-public places like in the car. Any act of invasion by the authority aimed at interfering 
with this right will be in contravention of the Article. It is however to be noted that the more public the act 
occurs will determine to an extent whether there is a violation of this right. The court has held in the case of 
Friedl v Austria7 that there was no violation of this provision following the applicant being photographed by the 
police during a political demonstration to which he was involved. 
 
Rights to sexual orientation 
Considered to be intimate with personal life is one’s sexual relation and orientation. Inherent in the personal life 
of a person is his or her exclusive ability to rule his or her sexual world. The court has in a number of cases held 
that it is an unjustifiable interference for a law to prohibit homosexuality. In Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom8 
where legislation in Northern Ireland makes the act of homosexuality an offence whether it was committed in 
public or in private. The applicant argued that such was an interference with his right to respect for personal life. 
The court held that such interference was not justified provided it was between consenting adult parties.  
Closely related to this is the right of transsexuals. The position has seen some developments in recent time as 
opposed to earlier views9  where the court refused to hold that the refusal by the UK authority to amend official 
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 (2003) 
2
 (1985) 8 EHRR, 22-27 
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 (1997) 26 EHRR563 
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 See for instance the court’s decision in the case of Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom (1995) 19 EHRR 112 
5
 Burghartz v Switzerland (1993) 18 EHRR 101, Konstandinis v Stadt Altensteigstandamst (1993) ECR-I 1191, ECJ 
6
 Gaskin v United Kingdom (1989) 12 EHRR 36 
7
 (1995) 21 EHRR 83  
8
 (1981) 4 EHRR 149 
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records in other to give effect to the new personality of the transsexuals. Though this view is different from the 
views held by the court in the Belgian case of Van Oosterwijk v Belgium1 where such act amounted to violation 
of Article 8. The reason dominating the views being that official registers in the UK are of historic significance. 
The court has also stated in Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom2   that the detriments suffered by 
transsexuals in the United Kingdom in certain context is of minor significance to consider refusal to alter the 
registry an infringement to this right.   
But in more recent cases there appears to be a change in the position. In Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom3 
as well as I. v. United Kingdom4 the court has held a violation of the right to private life of transsexuals under 
Article 8.5 
 
(B)Family Life 
The right guaranteed under the convention is not that which seeks to protect a person’s right to achieve and form 
a family but to protect an existing one. The court has however held in Abdulaziz, cabales and Balkandali v. the 
United Kingdom6 that it is not to be said that all intended families are entirely out of the scope of Article 8. 
 The interpretation given by the convention to the notion of ‘family life’ and what should constitute one has been 
an evolution that follows closely to the social dynamics of family life. The court in deciding whether or not an 
arrangement falls under this category so as to be protected by Article 8 takes into consideration a number of 
factors. The most primary basis of a family life is a husband and wife relationship. But a marriage entered into 
for purposes of immigration might not be protected by Article 8 as the state will be justified to act in violation. A 
marital relationship with evidence of consummation and cohabitation will be sufficient to establish the existence 
of family life. A relationship between a biological child and mother or that between step-mother and child is a 
clear indication of a family life except on exceptional cases. In Berrehab v. Netherlands7  the European court of 
Human Rights held that: 
“the concept of family life embraces, even where there is no 
cohabitation, the tie between a parent and his or her child regardless of 
whether or not the latter is legitimate…Although that may be broken by 
subsequent events, this can only happen in exceptional circumstances” 
As it is with all rights protected under Article 8, the state in according respect for family life is not only expected 
to refrain from interference but should act positively to ensure such protection. In emphasising this, the court in 
Marckx v. Belgium (supra) held that the Article 8; 
“… does not only compel the state to abstain from…interference: in addition to this primarily negative 
undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life”8  
Family life under Article 8 extends to relationships otherwise than marriage. The court in Kroon v. Netherlands9 
recognised instances of de facto family ties where partners are living together and make children outside 
marriage. 
Respect for family life requires that each member of the family should have the right to enjoy family 
togetherness.  
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(c)Home 
The right guaranteed under this heading is synonymous and closely related to the one of respect for family life. 
There shall be no interference to one’s enjoyment to his home. There should be peaceful and quiet enjoyment of 
home free from arbitrary searches, smell, noise, pollution and any sort of interference. Aircraft noise has been 
held to violet this right to respect for home. In Hatton v United Kingdom1 the court found the complaint of the 
applicants who lived near RAF airbase where the jet aircraft produced noise that disturbed the peace of the 
occupants thereby causing depreciation in the value of the house to be violation of this right.  
However, not all noise arising from an aircraft will give rise to a right under this heading.2 
In S v France3 noise, night lights and creation of microclimate from a nuclear power station which affected the 
value of the house was held to be in violation of Article 8 but the court went on to hold that such interference 
was justifiable in the overall benefit of the community. 
Apart from this category of interference, personal invasion such as arrest at home or forcible entry as well as 
denial from access to one’s home have all been held to be interference to this right.     
The right for respect for home presupposes that the state must act positively to remedy any act of interference to 
private home or justify such continuous interference relying on (2) of 8 of the Article.  
 (d)Correspondence  
Interference with private correspondence is one of the vital categories of right protected by Article 8. It is an 
extension of what constitutes our private life relating to our communication with others. It appears though that 
those who drafted the wordings of Article 8 may have envisaged mail and telephone correspondence. But with 
the rise in technological advancement and rise in the variety of means of electronic communications, the Article 
is now interpreted to cover areas such as e-mails, fax transmission, text massages etc. 
It will constitute a violation where the state uses its powers to gather private information and forms security data 
of a person without his consent or knowledge.       
The instances under which this infringement can occur ranges from obtaining of personal detail from the 
security, photographing of an individual for purposes of police investigation, utilisation of fingerprint by the 
police after conclusion of a case, maintaining of medical records, tapping of telephone conversation, intercepting 
electronic correspondence, censoring prisoner’s correspondence as well as mounting surveillance on a person. In 
Silver v United Kingdom 4  where the prison authority placed a restriction on the category of personal 
correspondence which the prisoner can either receive or transmit, the complaint by the prisoners that such 
restriction were in violation of their Article 8 right was upheld by the court on grounds that such interference was 
not justifiable in a democratic society.  
There has been concern over the justifiability of the use of such closed-circuit television cameras, telephone 
tapping devices and video recording constantly used by security agents for crime detection and prevention as 
such easily infringe the provisions of Article 8. This is particularly very significant in relation to the 
admissibility of the evidence procured in violation of Article 8 in criminal prosecution, especially when it is the 
only available evidence which the prosecution requires to sustain conviction. The court will certainly look at the 
manner of intrusion into the private life by use of the device to come with the overall conclusion as to whether 
such violation was in accordance with the law and justifiable in a democratic society. In Khan V United 
Kingdom5 , the prosecution relied on the evidence obtained through illegal mounting of a listening device by the 
police where Mr Khan had made a confession to a friend of his involvement in a drug smuggling to which his 
cousin had been convicted of.  The European court held that Article 8 had been violated although, the trial 
cannot be said to have been unfair. The court further held that the United Kingdom has violated Article 13 for 
failure to provide remedy for Article 8 violation. 
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In all, surveillance and indeed any form of interference must be conducted in accordance with the law and 
necessary in a democratic society. The parliamentary enactment of the Regulation of investigatory powers Act 
2000 after the Khan’s case which provides a guideline to determine whether or not any state surveillance may 
infringe or justify the breach of Article 8 is a major step intended to reduce the risk of the breach of Article 8.1 
4. JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERFERENCE WITH THE ARTICLE 8 RIGHTS 
Common with many principles of law is the attitude of striking a balance between a general position and 
circumstances that give rooms for limitation. It may lead us to the temptation of running into a hasty conclusion 
that there is no such thing like ‘a right in absolute’.  
This is why the provision has properly been made under Article 8 (2) which gives a guide as to when the state 
will be justified to interfere with those rights that form the basis of individual autonomy. There are two major 
grounds of interference, they are; 
(a)Interference must be in accordance with the law  
Article 8 (2) requires that any interference must be in accordance with the law. This simply means that there 
must be a domestic law which not only permits but also clearly prescribes procedure for such interference. Such 
domestic law must be a proper law with reasonable accessibility and not some form of norm or unpublished 
official directives. 
(b)Interference must pursue a legitimate aim  
The protection of public safety, national security, the prevention of crime, protection of other people’s rights and 
freedom, economic well-being of the country and the overall interest of the community are basic recognised 
legitimate aims pursuant to which interference can be justified.  
 There is no doubt that issues of real purpose may arise but Strasbourg authority is always minded to favour the 
states.2  
(c)Interference must be necessary in a democratic society 
Any state which seeks to justify any act of interference in addition to establishing other requirements show that 
there was an urgent or pressing social need which when measured against the legitimate aim pursued will be 
proportionate. In short, the margin of appreciation which the state enjoys should be proportionate in measure.     
5. CONCLUSION 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights clearly remains a vital instrument that speaks volume of 
the need for social harmony not only as between individual citizens and the state but between citizens themselves 
as well. Its wordings have been given a wide range of interpretation to embrace those very vital aspects of our 
private life that requires the best of protection and as time goes on more principles will emerge through case laws 
to cover more areas.   
States have in no doubt strived through domestic legislative initiatives and judicial interpretations of domestic 
courts to bring in alliance the rights guaranteed under Article 8 as exemplified by the United Kingdom Human 
Rights Act, 1989.  
It is to my mind that the United Kingdom now enjoys a measure of stability in the legal climate over Right to 
privacy that was so dominated by criticisms before the decision in Wainwright v United Kingdom.  
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